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ABSTRACT

Challenges and Responses: An Analysis of Economic Development Among Some East Asian
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) or Areas; The Effect of Their Using Tax Incentive
Systems to Attract Foreign Investment with Lessons from Taiwan's Tax Incentive System as an
Illustration

By
Li-Pai-Chia Kuo

Sustained economic development since World War II was the phenomenon of the "East Asian
Miracle," although the glory was tainted by the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong were among the East Asian Newly Industrializing
Countries (NICs) who shared the phenomena but each had unique circumstances with which to
deal. China, on the other hand, stagnated before the 1978 opening to the world but has improved
spectacularly economically since, and retains its momentum going into the new millennium. The
motive and dynamics of the East Asian economic phenomena have been studied thoroughly, and
China seems to share some common bonds with its East Asian predecessors. This thesis analyzes
the post-WWII economic progress of Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as they were overseas
Chinese societies to which China has given special treatment to entice investment, and which
China has emulated since 1978. Economic planning or industrial policy was one of the common
bonds of these East Asian NICs in achieving their economic development. Using Taiwan's tax
incentive system as an illustration, this thesis analyzes Taiwan's system with a focus on how
such a system evolves over time. Timely and effective responses in the face of challenges surely
are the key to economic progress. Taiwan has managed to achieve certain progress even with its
imperfect policy-making system. At this post-1997 crisis period, a close study of the Taiwan
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story may offer lessons for Taiwan, China, or any other developing countries in their ambition to
achieve prosperity.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction
Once having been nicknamed the "four tigers"-South Korea, Taiwan and the city-states
of Hong Kong and Singapore--so called because of their similarity in achieving sustained rapid
economic development after World War n, were later named Newly Industrializing Countries
(NICs) by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. These East Asian
NICs' economic development has been lackluster and in fact, they have been struggling to come
out of the economic slowdown as the specter of the 1997 Asian financial crisis continues to 100m
larger. (Wade, 1998) Currently, China seems among the few countries in Asia boasting of
economic growth. (Walden Country Reports)

With China's huge 1.2 billion people as a potential market to attract investment from all
over the world, these East Asian NICs' success stories must naturally be the objects of emulation
to facilitate China's transition from a closed communist society to a more or less market-oriented
society. (Jia, 1987: 4) In fact, history is strewn with examples of China's learning from
outsiders-earlier, learning from the old Soviet Union and some old Eastern Europe Bloc
countries such as Yugoslavia before the opening and later, these market-oriented East Asian
countries or areas. (Chin, 1959: 44, 66-7)
From 1950s to early 1990s, these East Asian NICs succeeded in creating economic
progress by using industrial policies to shape their desired development. (Wang, 2001: 2-3) Their
success was also attributed to their adopting measures such as administrative reforms and
liberalized fiscal and financial regimes. These measures helped to make their environment more

amenable to international standards and able to attract desired foreign investment. (Cable and
Persaud, 1987: 1-17) Researchers also point out a number of similarities among these East Asia
countries: all are densely populated, deficient in raw materials, and all have emphasized exports
of manufactured goods. All are raised under the "Confucius" cultural influence. (Berger: 1986)
They all are linked economically by extensive webs of trade and investment and all enjoyed huge
trade surpluses with the U.S. (Noble, 1988: 1-2)

For a better learning curve, China has no reason to forgo learning from these East Asian
countries, which made decades of sustained economic progress while China stagnated
technologically and economically under Mao Tse-Tung's closed China policy and the cultural
revolution. In fact, since it opened to the out~ide world in 1978, China has more or less emulated
the economic measures-so-called East Asian model of economic development and industrial
policy of these economic predecessors, including their tax incentive systems--and reaped
bountiful rewards. For example, scholars have concluded that China's Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) were based on China's close study and understanding of Taiwan's successful Export
Processing Zones (EPZs). (Vogel, 1989: 127; Osborne, 1986) In only a quarter of a century,
China has made inroads into all aspects of export markets and literally replaced its predecessors.
China has become the world's third largest trading partner with the U.S. in the new millennium.
(Walden Country Report: China)

l
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1.2 The Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis is based on the assumption that the way toward prosperity is universal: those
administrative reforms, export-oriented industrial policy and more liberal fiscal and financial
measures instrumental to those East Asian NICs' success also may be helpful with other
developing countries such as China. To achieve the intended goal of sustained economic
prosperity, a continuing open and democratic society where the government lets go of control by
sharing resources with private sectors seems to be necessary. (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 57)
Also, political stability plays an integral role in economic progress. This latter assumption is
based on another observation that not all emerging countries succeed in achieving sustained
economic progress. For example, except Singapore, the rest of the five original members of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand are viewed as "second generation" or near NICs-they started economic
developing with the East Asian NICs almost at the same time, that is, after WWll, but these
countries lagged behind; their political instability was perhaps one of the major hindrances .
.(Hughes and Dorrance, 1987: 65, note 1; Lindblad, 1999: 259-72) Also, for the more recent
cases, Latin American countries did not achieve sustained economic progress after some initial
economic progress. (Banuri, 1991: 14) Scholars have also attributed this comparative inferior
performance to the degree of openness of economy. (Hughes and Singh, 1991: 60-97).

This thesis thus briefly reviews the economic development of Taiwan, Singapore and

,
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Hong Kong with an emphasis on how they became what they have become today. They are
chosen because they are among the aforementioned four East Asian NICs or areas and they are
the "overseas Chinese societies" that China has formally given special investment treatment and
from which China learned. (Lu, 1956: 63-8) For example, in 1985, China promulgated laws
providing preferential treatment for investments made by overseas Chinese. See, 1985
Regulations on Preferences for Overseas Chinese Investment. By analyzing the East Asian NICs
and China's economic development, this thesis argues that China does resemble these "overseas
Chinese societies" in terms of its preparedness in gaining sustained economic progress-it is
densely populated, it has emphasized exports of manufactured goods, and it is now linked
economically by extensive webs of trade and investment (for example, the bilateral trade between
Taiwan and China has increased sharply since the opening up) with these societies (with Hong
Kong returned to China as Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, HKSAR, since 1997) and
has enjoyed huge trade surpluses with the U.S, and with minor disruption, China is politically
stable and China keeps opening up its door. (Hsing, 1998: 1-39)

This thesis then focuses on a close study of one fiscal system these countries all use-the
tax incentive system. This thesis uses Taiwan's system as a sample representative of the East
Asian NICs' systems to illustrate how the system evolves to facilitate the adopting country's
economic progress-in essence, a history of challenges and responses. As foregoing, this thesis
is based on the assumption that emulation of systems among all these successful NICs and China
is inevitable and that China's learning was also supported by empirical data. In the context of
timelines, tax incentive systems have almost finished their mission in these East Asian NICs,

4

while China's system continues to evolve. The difference is in the stages of economic
development and also in the kinds of industries each country intends to entice. For example, tax
incentive systems are deemed to be more efficacious in export oriented manufacturing industries
(Guisinger, 1983), which contribute greatly to China's current continued economic progress, but
they are of lesser importance now in the East Asian NICs because their targeted industries have
been upgraded to high-tech industries or because the East Asian NICs are aiming to become
regional financial centers. This analysis will pinpoint that Taiwan's tax incentive system was
tailored to its specific needs as the society evolved. Rather than being strictly centrally planned,
Taiwan's system developed on an ad hoc basis. Although criticized as ill-coordinated and
fragmented, Taiwan's decision making system actually functioned to face varying external and
internal impacts as Taiwan evolved. (Noble, 1988: 41-2, 385) In the case of Taiwan,
paradoxically, the ill-coordinated situation lessens or disadvantages the government's power to
intervene too much. This leads to an observation that as a fiscal tool, flexibility maybe is the
single important constant in the face of ever-changing tides and waves of impacts. With this, the
thesis concludes that China, or other developing countries that aim to achieve sustained
economic progress with similar attendant circumstances, should be flexible in the face of
changes. This echoes a fundamental principle of tax policies in developing countries; that is,
developing countries' tax policies should be practical and accommodate the particular
circumstances of the country in question. (Bird, 1992; Li, 1988)

5

Chapter 2 Post WWII Economic Development

2.1 Overview of Economic Progress in Three East Asian NICs and China-From
1950s to 1990s
2.1.1 The Initial Stage-From 1950s to 1978: Stagnation versus Growth

Economic development was one of the most important motivations for China's opening
to the western world. During the 1970s, China, on the one hand, started to remedy the negative
impact, both socially and economically, of the "paranoid idealism" of the Cultural Revolution.
On the other hand, when China's new political leaders rushed to raise China's economic and
technological levels, their unpreparedness and ideological bias led to ineffective policies, such as
purchasing expensive foreign equipment and machinery without concomitant ability to install
and use it. These mistakes deepened China's economic impasse. Against this backdrop, the
opening policy was conceived in 1978 and went into full force after Deng Xiaoping's 1984
announcement reiterating China's resolution to open up. (Jiang, 1998: 559-62; Jia, 1994: 4;
Easson and Li, 1989: 2-5)

By contrast, ethnic Chinese societies outside China, notably three East Asian NICs, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, created sustained economic growth during the same period and
were on their way to becoming rich. Benefiting from ordered British governance, including a
rule of law society, efficient administrative systems and a laissez-faire economic tradition, Hong
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Kong was adept at adjusting its role to cope with the changing global climate. Variable factors
contributing to Hong Kong's economic success include: an efficient civil service, minimal
government regulation, and independent judiciary, neutral enforcement of laws and regulations,
and the entrepreneurial spirit of the Hong Kong populace. (Han, 1988: 333) Hong Kong was
among the first in Asia to have established the anti-corruption agency, the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), in defiance of the deep-rooted governmental official
conuption issues related to Chinese societies. Through ICAC, Hong Kong established its image
of efficiency and no red-tape. (Chan, 1997: 101) Starting from the 1950s, Hong Kong discovered
that export-oriented business was more suited for its society than import substituting industries,
because of Hong Kong's limited domestic customer base, small size, and few natural resources.

Since its founding in 1965, the tiny city-state of Singapore, facing political and economic
challenges from imposing neighbors such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, strove to define
its identity in the world. Thanks to an autocratic polity that enforced its policies with powers
akin to those of a police state, Singapore moved fast to implement an export-oriented policy and
attract multinational companies. Singapore successfully made its human and physical
infrastructures more amenable to international standards by undergoing complete social and
administrative reforms and, with foreign help, investing heavily in physical construction.
Attracted by a conducive business climate and an extremely honest, efficient administrative
system, foreign direct investment swarmed to take advantage of Singapore's low-cost labor. As a
result, Singapore enjoyed a double-digit growth rate during the 1970s along with the formation of
its regional manufacturing center. Singapore has developed into a major manufacturing center for

1
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textiles, clothing, phannaceuticals, and computer components. It also has become a major center
for shipbuilding and oil refining in Southeast Asia. Multinational corporations, which have
established the manufacturing facilities and regional headquarters in Singapore, have helped
create Singapore's rapid economic development. Singapore has achieved this mainly by giving
preferential treatment including tax incentives and by making low-cost labor available, although
the latter factor declined in the 1980s. (Bennett, 1993: 3-6)

By high fines and even prison terms, Singapore has raised its general civilian levels
rapidly and became a reputed clean, civilized, and orderly society. These social reform measures
could involve detailed civilian life such as following the traffic signs, no scattering garbage,
courtesy, no spitting, and no public urinating. The administrative reforms also were strictly
implemented to reach all aspects of a public servant's life: anticorruption measures and service
efficiency improvement were relentlessly pursued by the government. In achieving these goals in
a short period oftime, the scope of government interests invoked and enjoyed by the Singapore
government that infringed on individual privacy far exceeded western standards. For example,
Bennett points out that despite being known for its advanced communications and information
processing infrastructure, the Singaporean government exercises a remarkable degree of control
over the dissemination of information, including not allowing individual Singaporeans to own
satellite dishes because they could use the dishes to receive unauthorized broadcasts, and a
closely monitored and controlled circulation of magazines and newspapers. (Bennett, 1993: 23-4)
Also, influential politicians state that Singapore recognizes no first amendment right to freedom
of the press and Singapore does not aim to approximate U.S. practice. (Kelly and London, 1989:
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364) To this day, Singapore maintains its competitiveness by the appeal of its uncorrupt and
extremely efficient administrative systems despite its generally viewed strict legal system. (Chan,
1997: 101; Norton, 1998: 226)

Taiwan, helped by the generous U.S. financial aid during the Korean War and the ensuing
decade, shed the negative image of a defeated former Japanese colony by becoming an export
phenomenon during the 1970s. Note that, however, some scholars attributed Taiwan's post-

WWII economic success to the Japanese colonial legacy. (Barnett and Whyte, 1982: 1,065-89) At
one time, Taiwan's economy languished along with shrinking diplomatic relationships with the
world because of an inflexible political claim to mainland China, which culminated in
withdrawal from the United Nations. In the early 1970s, the political setback, in addition to the
oil crisis gravely impacted Taiwan's burgeoning economy. Taiwan's economic debacle was
further aggravated by late-started infrastructural improvement as the Nationalist government did
not plan to stay in Taiwan until into the 1970s. The first major infrastructure construction in
Taiwan started with the Ten Construction project, which included building the first south-north·
highway, construction of seaports, dams, freeways, railways and airports in 1973, some 28 years
after the Japanese's retrocession from Taiwan. This project aimed to repair the war-damaged
Japanese infrastructures and the whole project finished in 1979. (Li, 1988: 49-51)

The economic planning in Taiwan was prompted by the prospect of an eventual cutoff in
American support and the evident exhaustion of primary import substitution. (Noble, 1988: 36;
Li, 1988: 25-6) Unlike its authoritarian political system, the economic planning bureaucracy was
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ill-coordinated and fragmented. (Noble, 1988: 385) The bureaucracy enjoyed freedom of
creating policy because of the absence of party and legislative oversight since top leaders and the
government policy-making technocrats were all Nationalist Party members. However, the
administrative structure was "a profusion of independent cabinet-level agencies," whose
complexity and fluidity counterbalanced the policy-making. (Noble, 1988: 41-2) Nonetheless,
Taiwan's economy managed to take offwhen it nimbly used economic techniques such as export
processing zones, tax incentive systems, and double-rate (inteIest and currency) controls to
implement an export-oriented industrial policy as well as a partially liberalized fiscal and
financial policy. Taiwan's post-war economic growth was generally characterized as occurring in
three stages: in the 1960s, an expansion toward manufacturing exports; the import-SUbstitution
industrialization in the 1970s, and the industrial upgrading toward high-tech industries in the
1980s (Gereffi, 1990; 3-31).

In conclusion, at the time when China opened up in 1978, there was a great gap in terms
of economic situations between the three East Asian NICs and China. The successful experiences
of these East Asian NICs, however, attest that a Chinese (or Chinese majority) society can learn
and benefit from the Western systems as opposed to being devoured by the Western machines.
This deep-rooted xenophobia of Western things comes from historical experience-the economic
relationship between China and Western countries was forced upon China by the Western
powers, notably Britain, through the Opium War in the late nineteenth century. The resulting
establishment of the treaty-port system and trading by the Western powers gave birth to
economic and political imperialism in China. (Fairbank, 1978: 491-542) As far back as in the
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late Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1616-1911 A.D.), the concept "make foreign things serve China"
started. This argument has since proved to be an indispensable part of the Chinese cultural
heritage (Jia, 1994: 2-4). The whole political-economic struggle of China since the late Qing
dynasty has been a history of whether a Chinese society can use the Western system or be used
by it. This fear about the power of Western systems, and a sense of xenophobia about foreign
participation in Chinese economic life that lingers in politics, has shown up in a form of
conservatism and caution about using foreign capital, technology, and investment throughout
modem Chinese history. These East Asian NICs' successes awoke for China a sense of
empowering in terms of dealing with the Western systems. Thus, in the late 1970s, emulating the
economic achievement of these overseas Chinese societies by adopting foreign economic
measures, capital, technology, and investment was a logically acceptable compromise for an
autarchic and xenophobic China. (Jia, 1994: 3-4) Also note that this new learning and assistance
from East Asian NICs and later Western countries was viewed differently from China's prior
experience of getting assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Before
the opening-up, Western help was viewed as a taboo of getting help from "imperialist" and
"capitalist" nations; whereas aid from the former Soviet Union and the former Eastern European
Bloc were viewed as based on equality and mutual respect of sovereignty. (Chin, 1959: 44)

2.1.2 "Chapter Two"-From the 1980s on: Challenges and Responses

The three East Asian NICs continued to grow and transform from the 1980s on, only to
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see signs of slowdown in the end of the 1990s. China meanwhile has improved sharply its
economic progress, some of which has been accomplished by replacing one by one many laborI

intensive industries or export oriented manufacturing industries ofthe three East Asian NICs.

I

1i

I

2.1.2 (a) From 1980s to 1990s: Growth and Transformation

Hong Kong became a light manufacturing center in the 1970s by utilizing its geographical
and transportation advantages: Hong Kong is situated at the southern edge of Asia where
waterways converge and it has a good deep-water port. Hong Kong further adopted a fully
deregulated trade and financial regime during the 1980s and became the foremost financial center
of Southeast Asia. By 1997 before the Chinese takeover, Hong Kong established itself as the
eighth largest trading power in the world. Hong Kong was the fifth largest banking center for
external financial transactions, the fifth largest foreign exchange market, and the seventh largest
stock market. Hong Kong has the world's largest container port. (Financial Secretary's Office,
Hong Kong: 1997)

In the 1980s, consolidating its status as a primary center for foreign equity investment,

Singapore transformed its labor-intensive industries into high-tech and service sectors as the
labor market matured and the low-wage work force grew to be well-educated, largely Englishspeaking professionals. (Fong, 1987: 84-100) Singapore also maintained its competitiveness
with one of the largest and most efficient container port facilities in Southeast Asia as well as one
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of Asia's best infrastructures. (Walden Country Report: Singapore)

Going into the 1980s, heeding the tidings of the times, Taiwan revamped its tax incentive
system to attract high-tech and service industries to replace traditional light manufacturing
industries. Environmental concerns also played a role in pushing Taiwan to change from laborintensive industries to current secondaiy high-tech based industries-such as original equipment
manufacture ("OEM") for advanced countries and computer chip foundries. (Li: 1988; Wang:
2001)

,

2.1.2 (b) Into the New Century

!I

The new millennium brings in a new chapter for each ofthese four societies. Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the new Hong Kong, with ambivalent feelings, has
returned to China on condition that China allow Hong Kong to retain its autonomy for the next
50 years. Hong Kong's doubt about its continuous prosperity manifested during and after the pretakeover Sino-British negotiation was not without merit: In 1999, China overturned a Hong Kong
high court's decision, putting into doubt China's keeping its promise ofletting Hong Kong enjoy
a 50 year autonomy; the lack of or postponement of infrastructural investment and long-term
planning during a decade of the Sino-British negotiation and following started taking a toll on
Hong Kong. Instead of continuing growing into a better global financial center or China's
financial window to the world given its pre-turnover strength in both financial infrastructure and
human resources, Hong Kong faces competing threats from cities such as Shenzhen and
Shanghai. The former now grabbed Hong Kong's container business by competitive pricing. The
latter possessed time-honored better strategic geographic and transportation location and thus,
human resources, goods and wealth all gravitated toward this historically-proven city, not to
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mention China's policy emphasis on Shanghai. (Wu and Wong, 1997) The anxiety and
insecurity about Hong Kong's future led to series of mass demonstrations recently.

After having benefited from an efficient autocratic polity and the British legacy of an
ordered civil government system, Singapore's ambition to seize the chance of Hong Kong
handover to be the regional financial center was disrupted by its hubris--the less noticeable
downside of being an autocratic government-that is, maintaining a more or less rigid legal
system and allowing limited information flow. The Singapore government has been by far the
dominant player in the city-state's economic development. The government maintains the
primary role in all aspects of economic policy-making and for the most part has not incorporated
the private sector into the process. (Lim, 1983) Although this tight regulation contributed to
Singapore's earlier success, the rigid governmental control may dampen Singapore's leap to
upgrade itself. Bennett argues that the heavy-handed regulatory environment of Singapore
threatened Singapore's aspirations to become a world-class financial center, in the face of
numerous neighboring countries posed to replace Singapore's then labor-intensive industries.
(Bennett, 1993) Others criticized Singapore's rigid legal system, while conceding its other
strength such as an extremely uncorrupted system. (Norton, 1998: 226)

Taiwan, functioning from the limited freedom granted by its hybrid, overlapping policy
making cabinet-level administrative machines, demonstrated its economic resilience to have
survived international economic crises, competition and even overcome the crippling diplomatic
deadlock occasioned by its stiff political claims. In the meantime, except the early success of the
export-oriented industrial policy, Taiwan's emphasized industries have failed one by one-from
the capital- or tech-intensive industries such as heavy-machinery, basic metal, petro-chemical and
vessel construction industries, the national defense industry, and super lCs industry such as
DRAM makers. Into the 1990s, Taiwan has succeeded only in becoming the center of a
semiconductor chip foundry. The latter's success was attributed to the government's cooperation
with private sectors after its initiation, rather than adopting a centrally-planned position. (Wang,
2001: 167-9)
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China remains the only economically growing country among the areas compared.
However, cautions are to be heeded for such areas as ideological controversies, together with the
resulting policy instability, inflation, and old burdens such as inefficient state enterprises. (Jia,
1994: 169-75) As recently as 1996 in the wake of ideological disputes, China abruptly stopped
most new economic measures, with the tax incentive system amongst them. This could be a sign
of political power struggle; or, more precisely, a reaction to a political vacuum as a new
generation of leaders replaced the old guard. Ostentatiously, the discontinuation of the tax
incentive system was a response to a World Bank article arguing against the utility of such
system in helping China get desired foreign capital and technology. (Jiang, 1998: 553) In another
development, China also asked foreign law firms in China to disclose certain client information.
This move put China's sincerity to comply with international standards seriously in doubt. In
200 1, China discouraged internet development, for fear that this modem gadget would promote
infonnation flow to an extent that China cannot police. In addition, China has yet to learn to
cope with some main side effects of economic development-inflation and the gradually
expanding wealth gaps between areas and between people. According to one scholar's
recommendation, China may shorten its learning curve by absorbing the rich experiences from
the newly returned Hong Kong. (Norton, 1998: 215-6)

2.2 The Future--Danger or Opportunity?

As economic development is a dynamic process that needs constant new inputs to renew
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and rejuvenate, no societies are spared to live in yesterday's glory. Fortunately, these four
societies do not seem to cease to face and cope with new challenges. Just as the Chinese
equivalent of the word "crisis" is of dual nature--danger and opportunity, the current plateau
each of these four societies faces may well represent both possibilities. China has finished and
even excelled in many aspects through economic emulation. Feeling blessed or not, China's
quarter-of-a-century old economic experiment has brought with it a qualitative change to the
fundamentals. As population moves to where the job market is and where the economic
development is, China's society-maintenance systems such as food rationing and travel controls
have been hard to maintain. For example, reports on the so-called "blind popUlation flow to the
cities" were numerous. This happened against the backdrop of China's population control
tools-the neighbor-spying system. Whether these changes represent danger or opportunity
depends on how China views them. China can always go backward to the longstanding autarchic
and xenophobic tradition, but China can also choose to stick it out with the opening, bearing
predictable growing pains. With disproportionate size, natural endowment and other factors, the
three (with Hong Kong became HKSAR, technically not an "overseas Chinese society" after its
turnover) East Asian overseas Chinese societies' experiences may not be exemplary enough for
China. However, the experiences of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan all attest to the
importance of a more open and free society -including a more liberal economic policy, an
ordered civil governance provided by rule oflaw, freedom of information exchanges--in creating
sustained economic development. (Norton, 1998; Bennett, 1993; Li, 1988; Han, 1998) Of these
three Asian societies, Hong Kong had all of the three elements and won the economic race, if
any, in becoming the primary regional center. The task now is whether China can allow the Hong
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Kong Special Administrative Region to continue grow stronger and better. Singapore had
achieved one of the most accelerated economic development thanks to its roughly having the first
two elements; its drawbacks of selected adherence to the rule of law principle and limited
information freedom only showed in latter advanced development. Taiwan, with its tripartite
origin of influences-China, Japan and the U.S., achieved a middle-of-the-road result since it
had all these three elements but more or less discounted; Taiwan's latest development, for
example, the recent years since its lifting the Martial Law, saw a burst-out new vigor and
confirmed further the importance of the direction of a more open and freer society. The lifting of
the Martial Law in 1987 created a series of social, political, and economic reforms including
administrative efficiency improvements, tax law and investment overhauls. However, after
becoming the "most democratic Asian society" (Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2000) by voting
for a non-Nationalist President, Taiwan's new social vigor was partially cooled off by the
lingering economic slowdown.

Who is going to write a better sentence for their next chapter depends on how each of
these societies deal and cope with the dual nature of crisis-<ianger or opportunity in the new
century.
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Chapter 3 Tax Incentive System
3.1 An Analysis of a Fiscal System Used by the East Asian NICs or AreasLessons from Taiwan's Tax Incentive System as an Illustration for the East
Asian NICs' Adapting to the Ever-Changing Times and Tides of the World
3.1.1 Economic Planning and Economic Development of the East Asian NICs

Scholars have pointed out common bonds such as cultural heritage, dense population, and
a deficiency of resources as motives for the economic development of the East Asian NICs.
They also argue about the impact of industrial policy upon the structural transformation and
upgrading of the economy for the East Asian economic phenomena. (Noble, 1988: 2-3)
Scholars argue that some of the success of East Asian NICs lies in their governments' using
industrial policy to guide firms and industries toward economic activities with long-term benefits
for their economies. These East Asian NICs use tax breaks, provision of financing, protection of
infant industries, promotion of economies of scale, and assistance in the acquisition and
dissemination of foreign technology to create comparative advantages in various industries
critical for long-term growth. (Johnson, 1982; Johnson, 1981: 9; Wade, 1990: 23-61) Others
argue that the free market structure is better than governmental industrial planning (Clinger,
1984: 3-5). This includes Schultze's attribution of Japan's post-WWII economic success mainly
to the huge savings rate, aggressive business leaders and modem technology rather than to the
government's industrial policy. (Schultze, 1984: 12) The argument goes on that the government
is not able to identify the right industrial structure in carrying out an industrial policy; and
government does not have clear criteria to decide which industries to protect or restructure in
governing a systematic government policy (Schultze, 1984: 15, 17). Note that even in an
advanced country such as the U.S., which boasts of no industrial policy, government intervention
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or spending has contributed to the protection of infant industry and later technology-sensitive
industries. For example, Branscomb argues that U.S. government spending on defense-related
R&D and on the development of military technologies in fact has had the effect of an industrial
or technology policy. (Branscomb, 1992: 2,4) Farrell and Mandel point out that U.S. government
funds have helped protect many infant industries, such as airlines and electronics; they also argue
that the Reagan Administration's providing huge tax breaks for the real estate industry and
funding high-tech industries like biotechnology had the effect of an ad hoc industrial policy.
(Farrell and Mandel, 1992)

3.1.2 Industrial Policy-Economic Planning

The active use of industrial policy to achieve the goals of advancing from developing
countries to developed countries can be exemplified by the case of Taiwan. A scholar and one of
the main planners for the shaping of Taiwan's industrial policy and economic development, Kuo-
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Ting Li, points out that because of Taiwan's limited resources in both human and physical capital
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as well as lack of natural resources, the Taiwan government had to plan carefully to utilize the
limited available means to achieve goals when Taiwan started to develop after wwn. (Li, 1988:
216) Li notes that the Taiwan government has established six guiding principles in shaping its
industrial policy and economic development. These are: (1) An evolutionary approach to
technological advancement; (2) A balance between industry and agriculture; (3) International
cooperation and an investment climate conducive to self-help; (4) heavy educational investment;
(5) Overseas feedback for planning and review; and (6) Fiscal conservatism and a balanced
budget. (Li, 1988: 217-22) However, Li also points out that despite the existence ofa well
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thought-out plan, unexpected developments will occur and cause constant revision, and that coordination, follow-up, and evaluation of the economic development planning are important. (Li,
1988: 37)

3.1.3 Policy Option--Tax incentive system

Debates linger about the efficacy of tax incentive systems. For example, Surrey argues
that direct expenditures are a better method of implementing social policy, and that tax
expenditures are generally wasteful, inefficient, and inequitable. (Surrey, 1973: 126-54) Zelinsky
argues against the inefficiency, stating that tax incentive systems can be efficient; for example,
tax incentive systems may be more efficient for a government's program because of lower
transaction costs. (Zelinsky, 1986) Yelpaala argues that tax incentive systems are in<:!fficient in
the context of foreign direct investment. (Yelpaala, 1985) Scholarly debates aside, country
studies have shown that the right kind of tax regimes and incentives may, indeed, be important,
especially when pursuing export-oriented investment. (Guisinger, 1983) Scholars point out that
fiscal incentives may be important but they need be looked at in the context of corporate tax
levels as a whole and the needs of particular types of investors. This refers to the empirical
studies that show that export-oriented investment and large-scale investments do require
incentives. Also, for businessmen, tax incentives are viewed as secondary because the post-tax
profitability of new investments is of limited significance if there are not enough markets or the
costs of production are high. A further conclusion is that a tax incentive system can be viewed
from the reverse side: although the efficacy of the tax incentive system is debatable, the lack of it
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may create an adverse impression for a developing country as it is viewed as though the country
does not want to compete in enticing foreign investment. (Cable and Persaud, 1987: 11-2)

A tax incentive system is a fiscal system using tax holidays, reduced tax rates, tax credits,
reductions, investment refunds, accelerated depreciation allowances and investment allowances
or subsidies, carry-over loss and other tax burden reducing measures to gear foreign investment
toward the adopting country or to favor the specific industries the adopting country desires to
develop. (Jiang, 1998: 550; Cable and Persaud, 1987: 11) As with industrial policy, the three
East Asian NICs and other developing countries have actively adopted tax incentive systems to
attract and shape the direction ofthe foreign capital. (Cable and Persaud, 1987) Scholars indicate
that, "for most governments, taxation is perhaps the most readily available instrument of
industrial policy." (Okimoto, 1989: 86)
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3.1.4 Policy Option-Free Trade Zone
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Often, free trade zones are used together with tax incentive schemes, especially when the
developing countries seek to attract export-oriented investment but the domestic costs are high
due to government protection. Within the zones, investment can enjoy long tax holidays and thus
lower cost for investors to facilitate export-oriented industries. Thus, the developing country can
achieve its goal of attracting export-oriented industries and also maintain its import barriers to
protect its fragile domestic market. (Cable and Persaud, 1987: 12-3)
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3.1.5 Policy Option-Exchange Rate Control

Currency rate control is another tool developing countries use. Developing countries use
exchange rate control to maintain a country's balance of payments while basically recognizing
the freedom of investors to repatriate their capital and profits. Various forms of exchange control
usually affect the importation of goods for production, the ease and extent of repatriation of
capital, and local currency borrowing. This factor is viewed as a negative factor to attract foreign
investment. However, it is also essential to keep the export-oriented countries from massive
capital flight. (Cable and Persaud, 1987: 13)

3.2 An Analysis of The Tax Incentive System in Taiwan
3.2.1 Starting out-the Intertwined U.S.-Japanese Influence

Most economic measures that Taiwan adopted, such as export processing zones, a VAT
tax system and a tax incentive system, owed their origins to Japan, whose tax systems and other
economic development policies were in tum modernized during the American occupation after
the WWII thanks to contribution from American experts during General Douglas MacArthur's
regime. For example, Carl S. Shoup held a six economist team (known as the Shoup Mission) to
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have contributed to the modernization of Japan's tax system. (New York Times, March 16,2000)
U.S. Aid during the Korean War not only introduced the economic planning concept into
Taiwan, but also catalyzed the starting of economic planning with U.S. Aid's departure. (Li,
1988: 36)

As a tiny island country with few natural resources, Taiwan's economy has traditionally
relied on international trade-trade with mainland China in the Qing Dynasty, trade with Japan
during the Japanese governance of Taiwan, and trade globally after the WWII, with the U.S. as
the main trading partner. (DeGlopper, 1995) As a result, Taiwan was open to learning and
adapting to new things. While China failed to learn from western culture and technology, Japan
had prospered by learning western social, political, and technological systems since the Meiji
reformation (1868-1912 A.D.). Japan's more modernized economic and financial systems had
been assimilated into Taiwan society during Japan's fifty-year (1895-1945 A.D.) governance.
(Numazaki, 1992: 51-67) In the historic tragedy, the "228 event" in 1947, and the subsequent
"White Horror Era," the Nationalist government systematically massacred Taiwanese elite under
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the guise of exterminating either Japanese or Communist influences. The result was an
immediate brain drain and longstanding hatred between local Taiwanese people and the
mainlanders. (Noble, 1988: 36) Nonetheless, when the Nationalist government realized that it
needed to plan for a permanent stay in Taiwan, it found out that, resented or not, the Japanese
systems were deeply imbedded in Taiwan and superior to comparable systems since Japanese
society was more advanced than Taiwan. Thus, when Taiwan started serious economic planning
in the wake of the withdrawal ofthe U.S. financial aid, the Japanese legacy and some of its
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economic model became the natural basis of emulation. Subsequently, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore and the UK have influenced Taiwan's tax incentive system as Taiwan continuously
integrated and revised its laws.

3.2.2 Challenges and Responses--The Evolution of Taiwan's Tax Incentive
System
Taiwan's tax incentive system is part of its economic planning started by an agency
formed to handle U.S. Aid. The economic planning machinery was formalized when the U.S.
Aid departed in 1965. (Li, 1988: 26) As a fiscal policy tool, Taiwan's tax incentive system
evolved when Taiwan's society and economic development changed.

In 1960, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (the "SEI"), Taiwan's first tax
incentive law, went into effect. This law aimed to attract foreign investment to develop Taiwan's
export-oriented industries in replacement of the prior import-substituting industries. The tax
incentive system underwent an overhaul in 1970 to fit Taiwan's increased pace of economic
development, and thus the Second Stage of the SEI took effect. In 1980, the tax incentive system
was further upgraded to be the Third Stage of the SEI. This overhaul was to gear foreign
investment toward the high value-added industries and the importation of anti-pollution
equipment and facilities as Taiwan transformed from the export-oriented labor-intensive
industries to a new stage. In 1990, The Statute for Upgrading Industries (the "SUI") replaced the
SEIs, to suit the direction of establishing high-tech based industries, mainly the semiconductor
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chip industries.

3.2.3 The Initial Effort--the First Stage of the Statute for Encouragement of
Investment (the "SEI") (1960-1970)
Taiwan's post-WWII industrial development began with import substitution in the 1950s
by the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB). Under this policy, the economic stage focused on
the production of consumer goods and agricultural products while importing raw materials,
machinery, and equipment. The departure of U.S. Aid prompted the setting up of a cabinet level
economic planning agency. First, the Council for US Aid was reorganized to the Council for
International Economic Co-operation and Development (CIECD). In 1965 when U.S. aid phased
out, the head of the Council became the Minister of Economic Affairs, which formalized the
economic planning organization. (Li, 1988: 25-6)

In the 1960s, export-oriented industries development gradually replaced the earlier
emphasis on import substitution. The policy change was to resolve the basic condition of raw
material shortage, especially in light of U.S. Aid withdrawal. This policy was also to take
advantage of the excessive agricultural workforce and tum the deficits in the balance of payments
into surplus. (Li: 1988: 13-4)

3.2.3 (a) The Establishment of The First Stage of the SEI-1960

In 1960, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (the "SEf'), Taiwan's first tax
incentive law, took effect. However, due to a residual policy of building import-substituting
industries, this law had little effect until the withdrawal of the U.S. financial aid became
imminent in 1965 when the speed of moving toward export-oriented industry increased. New
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incentive provisions were added to tailor the SEI to suit the needs of the export-oriented policy.

The tax preferences of the SEI included tax holidays, reduced tax rate, tax exemption and
tax reduction. Later, accelerated depreciation, tax deduction, and deduction carry-over were
added during the different stages of the SEI. Enterprises in productive industries were to enjoy
the tax preferences.

Article 5 of the SEI provided a five-year tax holiday for "productive enterprise" which is
defined in Article 3 as a company conducting any of the following operations: manufacturing,
handicraft, mining, agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal husbandry, transportation, warehousing
and public utility. The tax holiday started from the date of starting sales of goods/rendering
services or employment. Article 10 provided a reduced 18% maximum income tax rate,
including all surcharges, after the five-year tax holiday, as opposed to the 32.5% maximum
income tax rate for ordinary for-profit enterprises. Article 12 provided a tax exemption for
reinvested profits. Articles 28 and 29 provided a tax exemption or reduction of the stamp tax.
Those transactions applicable for this tax benefit included: 1) Agreements for loans, mortgages,
or pledges, and written acknowledgment of debts and debentures; 2) Discount contracts,
acceptance contracts, promissory notes, and bank drafts or bills of exchange; 3) Contracts for
future delivery of goods or services; and 4) Certain Invoices.
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Table 1 Basic Scheme of the First Stage SEI-1960

Scheme

Scope

Tax Holiday

1.

Income Tax Rate
Tax Exemption
Exemption or Reduction of Stamp
Tax

Starting Date: date of sales of
goods or employment
2. Duration: 5 years
3. Applicable: 10 Productive
Industries-manufacturing,
handicraft, mining agriculture,
forestry, fishery, animal
husbandry, transportation,
warehousing and public utility.
Up to 18%; applicable after 5 year
tax holiday for Productive Industries
Reinvested Profits
1. loan agreement, mortgage,
pledge, debt note;
2. discount contracts, acceptance
contracts, promissory note, bank
drafts or bills of exchange;
3. contracts for delivery of goods
or services;
4. certain invoices.

Comparison with enterprises not
applicable to SEI
NIA

Up to 32.5% for For-Profit
Enterprises;
NIA
NIA

3.2.3 (b) The 1965 Revision of the First Stage SEI

In 1965, in light of the implementation ofthe export-oriented policy, additional tax
incentives were added-installment payments for tax and import duty exemption to encourage
development of export-oriented industries.

Article 23 provided for installment payments of tax, and import duty exemptions to
encourage both local people and foreigners to import foreign machines, equipment, or parts for
the use of productive enterprises. At this stage, Taiwan had only basic agriculture-related
industries; the goal of the SEI was to attract manufacturing or labor-intensive industries that
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Taiwan lacked. The burden of proving that these imports or investments were new was on the
investors (Article 3). Only newly established productive industries were eligible for the beneficial
tax system. Those who qualified for the tax preferential treatment had to be limited corporations
organized under the Corporation Law for local people, or foreign equivalents who apply to invest
in Taiwan and get government approval pursuant to the Statute for Investment by Foreign
Nationals, promulgated on July 14, 1954 and as amended on December 14, 1959.

Table 2 New Tax Incentive Schemes Added at the 1965 Revision of the First Stage SEI

Scheme
Installment Payment of Tax
Import Duty Exemption
Burden of Proof -New Productive
Industries

Scope
Corporations organized by local
people and foreigners
Corporations organized by local
people and foreigners
Investors must prove their
enterprises are in new productive
industries

Comparison with prior law
N/A

N/A
N/A

3.2.3 ee) The 1967 Revision of the First Stage SEI

As the movement to an export-oriented policy became clearer, a revision in 1967
expanded the scope of productive enterprises to reflect such policy. By adding four additional
industries as qualified industries, this revision extended the definition of a productive enterprise
to include 14 industries, ranging from mostly export-oriented assembly or processing operations
to some domestic infrastructural construction related industries. These qualified industries
included: 1) Manufacturing industry: enterprises based on labor or machines which manufacture,
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assemble or process products; 2) Handicraft industry: enterprises based on handicrafts which
manufacture, assemble or process products; 3) Mining industry: enterprises engaged in
exploration, mining and ancillary flotation and refining; 4) Agricultural industry: enterprises
which utilize land and machines in farming and the ancillary product processing industry; 5)
Forestry industry: enterprises which utilize forest land and equipment for planting or replanting
forests and logging to produce wood-related products and their by-products; 6) Fishery industry:
enterprises which catch and cultivate marine animals and plants by fishing boats, cultivating
ponds, or equipment; and their ancillary processing, transportation and marketing industries; 7)
Animal Husbandry: enterprises which utilize ranches, farms, or equipment for raising and
breeding livestock and their ancillary product processing industry; 8) Transportation industry:
enterprises with power-driven facilities and capacity sufficient to undertake transportation of
passengers and/or cargo by water, land, or air; 9) Warehousing: enterprises which lease their
specific self-constructed warehouses for storage of goods; 10) Public Utilities Industry:
enterprises which provide the public with municipal transportation, telecommunications, health,
irrigation, faucet water, electricity, or gaseous fuel; 11) Public Housing Construction Industry:
enterprises which invest in construction of modem public housing units; 12) Technical Service
Industry: enterprises which furnish technical know-how or patent rights to assist the manufacture
of products which have not been produced domestically; 13) Hotel Industry: enterprises running
international tourist hotels, domestic tourist hotels, or public hotels within a forestry
entertainment area or scenic area whose construction and facilities conform to the govemmentprescribed criteria; and 14) Heavy-duty Machinery Construction Industry: enterprises which
engage in civil engineering construction with heavy-duty machinery.
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Table 3

Changes Made at the 1968 Revision of the First Stage SEI

Scheme
Expansion of applicable productive
industries

Scope
1. Adding 4 industries: public
housing construction, technical
service, hotel and heavy-duty
machinery construction industries.

Comparison with prior law
1. N/A
2. 10 industries as productive
industries eligible for tax
incentive schemes

3.2.4 Growing and Coping--The Second Stage of the SEI (1970 - 1980)
From 1961 to 1972, Taiwan's economic development accelerated, which made the First
Stage SEI insufficient to meet the needs ofthe time. Thus, a major overhaul of the system took
place in 1970 to make clear the applicable scope and ushered in the Second Stage ofthe SEI
("Second Stage SEr'). The government also started developing a securities market; the Second
Stage SEI thus included several provisions for promoting development of the securities market.
Subsequent crises Taiwan faced, such as the two oil embargos, brought several revisions to the
Second Stage SEI in order to meet the challenges. Also, this law contained a sunset provision,
Article 82. The provision provided that the statute would expire on December 31, 1980-reflecting Taiwan's ambivalence toward incentive schemes.

The main changes in the Second Stage SEI included simplified administrative procedures
and new incentives such as accelerated depreciation (Articles 6 to 8). This law also provided
incentives to promote securities markets, as part of efforts to strengthen capital markets as an
avenue for corporate finance. Also, tax exemptions on certain land use provisions were added to
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help investors securing land to facilitate the development of Export Processing Zones (EPZs).
Other additions included: provisions facilitating privatization of public enterprises and provisions
adding the arms-length transaction concept in dealing with transfer pricing issues.

Reflecting the ever-changing environments in Taiwan's highly developed stage during the
1970s, the Second Stage SEI underwent seven subsequent changes to cope with the changing
times and tides.

3.2.4 Ca) The Creation of The Second Stage of the SEI-1970

From late 1960s to 1970s, Taiwan's export-oriented industries bloomed due to the
movement of many low-wage laborers from the countryside into industrial areas. The measures
and incentives under the export oriented policy included the expansion of scope and adding new
schemes in the tax incentive system and setting up export-processing zones. (Liang and Liang,
1986: 106; Li, 1988: 138)

On the other hand, the rapid economic progress since the late 1960s created problems that
Taiwan had to face. These included stagnation of the farm sector and inflation. As part of
Taiwan's transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial society, country population
dwindled as people flooded to the city for jobs in the labor-intensive industries. In addition, the
global economic crises of the oil embargos in 1973 adversely affected Taiwan. (Li, 1988: 30-2)
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As new capital and technology were scarce during the early years of the Nationalist
government's reign, Taiwan's industries remained under heavy Japanese influence as the private
sector continued to operate the Japanese-era facilities or to depend on Japanese indirect
investment using local people as nominal business owners to circumvent the anti-Japanese
legislation. Taiwanese industries during the 1950s and 1960s were owned mainly by private
investors who used the former Japanese facilities and know-how to continue manufacturing since
there was a strong anti-Japanese atmosphere. The import-substituting policy helped the re-entry
of Japanese money and technology, through avenues allowed for entrepreneurs in the importsubstituting industries, since the Taiwanese industries needed the Japanese to supply the
innovative technology that Taiwan lacked. During the 1960s, the ability to provide EPZs with
Japanese-speaking staffwas important in Taiwan. (Hughes & Dorrance, 1987: 63). This need
dwindled in the 1970s as Taiwan utilized more liberalized trade, fiscal systems, and economic
policies to attract broader foreign investment from Europe and the United States. However,
Japan's more advanced technology and economic development, its proximity and Taiwan's old
ties with Japan all contributed to Japan's maintenance as Taiwan's second largest trading partner
after the U.S. for decades. Unlike Taiwan's trade surplus with the U.S., Taiwan's trade with
Japan was in deficits for years. (Li, 1988: 23-4)

Besides the administrative streamlining, the Second Stage SEI added the additional tax
incentive of accelerated depreciation (Article 6). Under the law, a productive enterprise may
select either accelerated depreciation, or a five year tax holiday starting from the date of starting
sale of goods, rendering services or employment. With accelerated depreciation, productive
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industries would enjoy shortened useful life of machinery or equipment up to half ofthat
permitted other industries. Under the method, if the original useful life ofthe machinery or
equipment is ten or more years, the shortened useful life shall be five years. If the original useful
life is less than ten years, it may be accelerated by half. As to buildings, constructions, and
facilities, communication and transportation facilities, their useful life may be shortened by one
third. These benefits applied to newly established productive enterprises, as well as to the
expansion (Article 2) and renovation (Article 8) of existing productive enterprises.

The Second Stage SEI also increased the maximum income tax rate for a productive
enterprise to 25%, from the previous 18% (Article 10). Certain capital- or technology-intensive
productive enterprises received a 22% rate. These included basic metal manufacturing
industries, heavy-duty machinery industries, petro-chemical industries and vessel manufacturing
industries.

To encourage reinvestment for productive industries, the Statute provided a tax deferral
for shareholders' undistributed profits when they were reinvested in the manufacturing (Article
12) to encourage reinvestment for productive industries. The new shares were distributed to the
shareholders in the form of capital increase in reinvesting in machinery, equipment, and
communication or transportation facilities for production of goods, rendition of services, or for
research and development. They were excludible from the shareholders' consolidated income, or
for-profit enterprise income of the taxable year for taxation. But when such shares were
thereafter transferred, bestowed, or distributed as legacy, the total amount ofthe price ofthe
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shares would be taxable income.

Further, in an initial attempt to develop capital markets, the Second Stage SEI allowed tax
exemptions on long term capital gains (held one year or longer) for registered stocks and bonds.
Article 15 of the Second Stage SEI prescribed that: Where a person sells registered share
certificates or corporate bonds publicly issued and listed on the market by for-profit enterprises,
or government bonds or development bonds issued by the government at various levels or by an
industrial bank, which he previously purchased or otherwise acquired and which he has held for
one year or more, the gain realized from such a sale above the cost may be excludible from his
taxable income. However, if losses were incurred as a result of the sale, such losses are not
deductible from person's taxable income for the taxable year.

Further, the Second Stage SEI raised the withholding tax rate for nonresidents' taxable
income to 30%, from the previous 15%. The law also reiterated that only Taiwan-source income
would be taxable (Article 17). In addition, the revision prescribed detailed rules to ease
productive enterprises' securing land as a continuing effort to facilitate the establishment ofthe
Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Articles 36 to 73 extensively regulated methods to acquire or
lease land for manufacturing, and defined the scope of tax exemptions or deferrals for purchasing
or leasing industrial use land. The revision also added provisions, Articles 74 to 79, regulating
the privatization of state-run enterprises and setting up a development fund (for economic
development) to help finance such privatization. This amendment also added the arms-length
concept in dealing with transfer-pricing issue (Article 7).
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Table 4 Basic Scheme of the Second Stage SEI--1970
Scheme
Accelerated Depreciation

Maximum Income Tax Rate

Tax Exemption of Reinvested ProfIts

Tax Exemption of Capital Gain by
Stocks and Bonds Held for One Year
or More
Increased Withholding Tax Rate

Scope
1. productive enterprises choose
either tax holiday or accelerated
depreciation
2. shortened useful life of fIxed
assets: i) machinery/equipment:
10 years to become 5 years;
lesser than 10 years to become
half of that useful life; ii)
buildings/ facilities/
transportation and
communication facilities:
accelerated by one third of
useful life.
3. applicable: i) new investors; ii)
expansion and renovation of
existing productive enterprises
Increased to 25%; some capital- or
tech-intensive productive industries
limited to 22%.
Not taxable income when
distributed; but transfer, bestowed as
a legacy shall be taxable income.
But no loss deduction for stock or
bonds transfer or sales;
1.
2.

30% for Taiwan-source income;
applicable: nonresidents;

Tax Exemptions or Deferrals for
Purchasing or Leasing Industrial Use
Land
Measures Encourage Privatization of
State Enterprises
Measures Encouraged Development
Fund
Added Arms-Length Transaction
Concept in Transfer Pricing

Comparison
N/A

Previously, 18%;

N/A

Previously, 15%.
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A
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3.2.4 (b) The 1972 Revision of the Second Stage SEI
During the decade of the Second Stage SEI, Taiwan revised the law frequently--seven
revisions happened during the life of the Second Stage SEI. These were in 1972, 1973, 1974,
1977, 1978, respectively, and two times in 1979.

The constant changes oflaws, on the one hand, showed Taiwan's flexibility and
willingness to cope with ever-changing internal and external economic impacts; on the other
hand, certain excessive changes exposed the structural defects of Taiwan's lacking a check-andbalance system, and demonstrate the ill-coordination and overlapping functions of Taiwan's
economic planning policy-making machine. (Noble, 1988: 41-2) For example, Taiwan tightened
its tax incentive law in 1973, which effect was mostly reversed by the revision less than a year
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later in 1974. (See, infra, sections on 1973 and 1974 revisions).

Table 5 Comparisons of Certain Changes Made During the Life of the Second Stage SEI
~axUnurnlncorne

Second Stage SE11970
1972 Revision
1973 Revision

1974 Revision
1977 Revision
1978 Revision
Two Revisions in
1979

Tax Rate

Tax Exemption of
Reinvested Profits

Withholding Tax
Rate

25% (22%)*

Yes

30%

25% (22%)*
35% (30%)*

Yes
No

30%
35%

30%(25%1*
25% _(22O/~*
25% (22%)*
25%(22%)*

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

35%
35%
35%
35%

*( ): rate in the parentheses is for certain capital- or tech-intensive productive industries.
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The 1972 revision aimed to solve the side effects ofindustrialization--stagnation of the
agricultural sector including low income of farmers, a shortage of farm labor resulting from the
urbanization of population, and rising labor cost and prices of agricultural materials. Moreover,
because Taiwan's average farming area per farmer was too small to make machine farming
feasible, there was a need for a fann production service industry that leased fanning machines.
The 1972 revision made the fann production service industry eligible for tax exemption and
accelerated depreciation. In the Second Stage SEI, the tax holiday provision was Article 6,
replacing the First Stage SEI's Article 5. This revision extended the tax holiday to for-profit
enterprises as well as unincorporated enterprises that engage in supplying fanners with
agricultural productive service and have been registered with the agricultural authorities.

Table 6 Changes Made at the 1972 Revision of the Second Stage SEI
Scheme
Expand Applicable Productive
Industry
Extension of Tax Holiday to
Unincorporated Enterprises

Scope
Added Farm production service
industry
Such enterprises shall engage in
supplying agricultural productive
service

Comparison with prior law
N/A
N/A

3.2.4 (c) The 1973 Revision of the Second Stage SEI.

The 1973 revision was in response to the government's decision to raise the tax to finance
the long overdue major repair and building of the debilitated Japanese Era infrastructure as the
government resolved to stay in Taiwan. The first of its kind for the Nationalist government since
its arrival in Taiwan, the Ten Major Development Projects were launched in 1973 and finished in
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1979. The infrastructure development involved repairing and building ports, airports, highways,
railways and dams. (Li, 1988: 15) Also, the revision removed loopholes that had existed in the
prior law.

The 1973 revision included increasing the maximum income tax rate for a productive
enterprise from 25% to 35% (Article 10). The rate applicable to certain capital- or technologicaladvanced enterprises was raised to 30%, as opposed to previous 22% (Article 10). The revision
abolished tax exemption of shareholders' reinvested profits (Article 12). The law changed the
tax deferral of long-term capital gain (held for one year or longer) of stocks and bonds purchases
(Article 10) to either tax-exemption if the purchase was before 1974, or taxable for half of the
income from the sale of registered stocks or bonds that were purchased during or after 1974. The
revision raised the withholding rate for nonresidents to 35%, from previous 30% (Article 17).
Individuals and for-profit enterprises could apply for a tax refund with proof oftaxes paid in their
domicile; however, the refund could not exceed their withholding tax on Taiwan-source income.

Table 7 Changes Made at the 1973 Revision of the Second Stage SEI
Scheme
Increased Maximum Income Tax
Rate
Abolished Tax Exemption of
Reinvested Profits
Changed Tax Deferral of Capital
Gain for Stock and Bond Held for
One Year or More
Increased Withholding Tax Rate

Scope
1. Up to 35%;
2. Some capital- or tech-intensive
new industries up to 30%

Comparison with prior law
1. Previously 25%
2. Previously 22%
1. Previously, tax exemption.

Tax exemption if purchased
before 1974;
2. Half of the sale income if
purchased in or after 1974
1. up to 35%
1.
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1. Previously, not taxable.

1. Previously 30%;

3.2.4 (d) The 1974 Revision of the Second Stage SEI

The worldwide economic recession caused by the 1973 OPEC oil embargo proved that
this tightened tax incentive law was badly-timed; it decreased Taiwan's economic resilience. In
1974, Taiwan revised the Second Stage SEI again, mainly to undo the stifling effect ofthe
previous revision and to tackle the worsening economy. These changes included lowering the
maximum income tax rate for productive enterprises to 30% (Article 10) as compared to the 35%
ceiling in the previous revision. The revision lowered the maximum income tax rate to 25% as
opposed to previous 30%, for capital-intensive and technology-intensive enterprises or those
productive enterprises issuing stocks publicly where the issuance involved only registered stocks.
Also, Article 12 was revived to allow retroactive tax exemptions for shareholders' undistributed
profits.

Table 8 Changes Made at the 1974 Revision ofthe Second Stage SEI
Scheme
Reduced Maximum Income Tax
Rate

Revived Tax Exemptions for
Reinvested Profits

Scope
1. Up to 30%
2. Some capital- or technologyintensive enterprises or publicly
traded productive enterprisesup to 25%
1. Applied retroactively to resume
the tax free regime of reinvested
profits;

39

Comparison with 1973 law
1. Previously 35%
2. Previously 30%

1. Reinvested Profits were taxable.

3.2.4 ee)

The 1977 Revision of the Second Stage SEI

In 1977, Taiwan revised the Second Stage SEI a fourth time to respond to fierce

competition from South Korea and Singapore. Taiwan's new policy was to promote the
modernization of traditional labor-intensive industries, and to encourage the development of
capital- or technology-intensive industries-including basic metal manufacturing industries,
heavy-duty machinery industries, petro-chemical industries and vessel manufacturing industries.

The tax holiday was extended to up to 9 years from the original 5 years. Many provisions
provided incentives for upgrading industries and R&D. These incentives included import duty
exemption, and classifying R&D expenditures as expenses. A tax holiday was applicable for
purchase of machinery and equipment and whole plant transfers. Other developments included
further regulations on securing land for industrial use, securities market regulation, and
continuing the Development Fund for Facilitating Taiwan's Economic Development

The 1977 revisions extended tax holidays for four more years (Article 6), in addition to
the initial five years to accommodate the latent profit-making nature of capital- or technologyintensive industries. This was achieved by delaying the starting date of the tax holiday for one to

I

four years after the date of sales of goods or employment. Previously, the starting date of the tax

j

holiday was the date of starting sale of goods or employment. In order to encourage plant
modernization, the revision extended tax holidays to new equipment and facilities. Previously,
only the establishment of new productive enterprises enjoyed this tax incentive. This provision
was to encourage productive enterprises to raise their productivity by expansion and renovation
(Article 6). The revision allowed nonqualified productive enterprises to enjoy the remainder of
the tax holiday when they purchased whole factory equipment from qualified productive
enterprises (Articles 2 and 3) moving to new facilities.

Articles 36 to 73 provided provisions encouraging R&D. For example, the Detailed
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Implementation Law of the Second Stage SEI allowed enterprises to allocate their research and
experiment expenditures as expense. Also, an import duty exemption on apparatuses and
equipment to be used for R&D purposes was granted.

The revision encouraged stock market growth by raising the maximum tax exempt
dividends from NT $2,000 to 8,000 (Article 16). This revision also reduced the tax rate for
limited corporations that issued their stock publicly from 25% to 10%, and abolished withholding
taxes on undistributed profits.

The law encouraged merger and acquisition by offering tax exemption or deferral on the
incident stamp tax, deed tax and land related capital gain tax for purchases and sales of
equipment, facilities, factories and land (Articles 33 to 35). The revision also expanded the
scope of persons qualified to purchase industrial use land to include prior land owners whose
lands were condemned by the government.

Article 76 also extended the funding sources of the Development Fund for Facilitating
Taiwan's Economic Development from income of recently privatized public enterprises to the
National Coffer appropriation. The provision also expanded the use of this fund beyond helping
to fund technology-intensive productive enterprises for the Ten Major Infrastructural
Construction Project to funding for purchases of machines and equipment.

Article 10 reduced the maximum income tax rate and surcharges of productive enterprises
to 25% from the earlier 30%. The revision decreased the preferred tax rate for basic metal
manufacturing industries, heavy-duty machinery industries, petro-chemical industries or other
encouraged capital- or technology-intensive industries to 22% from the previous 25%. The
change also allowed enterprises to write off 1% of their export loss reserves in order to encourage
export--this move was modeled after Japan's and South Korea's similar measures.
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Table 9 Changes Made at the 1977 Revision ofthe Second Stage SEI

Scheme
Expanded Tax Holiday Duration and
Applicable Range

Increased Maximum Tax Exempt
Dividends
Reduced Corporate Income Tax Rate
For Publicly Traded Corporation
Abolished Withholding Tax on
Reinvested Profits
Tax Exemption of Stamp Tax, Deed
Tax and Land-Related Capital Gain
Tax
Allowed R&D Expenditures as
Expenses
Import Duty Exemption on
equipment/facilities for R&D
Measures Encouraged Purchase of
Industrial Use Land
Extended Development Fund
Funding Source

Scope
1. Duration: Up to 9 years tax
holiday; certain capital- or techintensive industries may start tax
holiday one to four years after
date of starting sales of goods/
rendering services or
employment;
2. Expanded to : new
equipment/facilities purchases;
1. Up to NT$8,000

Comparison with 1974 law
1. Previously 5 years

1. Up to 10%

1. Previously 25%

1. Applicable for: purchase and sale
of equipment, facilities, factories and
land;

N/A

N/A
N/A
1. Extended qualified persons to
landowners whose land was
condemned;
1. Included the National Coffer
Appropriation

Extended Development Fund's Use

1. to funding for purchases of
machines and equipment

Extended Tax Holiday to Whole
Plant Transfer

1. Whole plant purchaser would
enjoy the remainder of the tax
holiday of the productive industry
plant seller
1. Up to 25%
2. Capital- or Tech-intensive
productive industries-22%
1. 1% of e~ort loss reserves

Reduced Maximum Income Tax
Rate
Allowed Loss Write-Off

1. Previously $2,000
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1. Previously the funding source
was the proceeds from Sales of
public enterprises
1. Previously funding for productive
industries for the Major Economic
Infrastructure Construction Plan
N/A

1.
2.
N/A

Previously 35%
Returned to the rate of 1970

3.2.4

(0 The 1978 Revision of the Second Stage SEI
One half year later, the Second Stage SEI was amended again. The change was modeled

after similar provisions of Singapore and the UK. This revision added two sections regulating the
taxation of nonresidents, allowing foreign investors to apply withholding tax for their profits
whether they stayed in Taiwan for longer than 183 days (Article 17, sections 1 and 2). This was
a change from Article 7 ofthe Individual Income Tax Law, which prescribed that foreigners who
stayed in Taiwan for 183 days or longer were taxed at the same progressive rates as residents.
Foreigners who stayed in Taiwan for less than 183 days were charged with withholding tax of
35% for their Taiwan-source income. This addition also gave foreign employees of a foreign
investors beneficial tax treatment: for those who stayed in Taiwan for longer than 90 days but
less than 183 days, their income was not deemed as taxable Taiwan-source income.

Table 10 Changes Made at The 1978 Revision of the Second Stage SEI

Scheme
Extended Withholding Tax
Applicability to Foreigners Even if
Staying Longer than 183 Days

Scope

Beneficial Tax Treatment for
Foreign Employees of a Foreign
Investor

1.

2.

Income from Taiwan not
deemed as Taiwan-source
income;
Applicable to: foreign
employees who stay longer than
90 days but shorter than 183
days;
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Comparison with prior law
1. Previously, foreigners staying for
longer than 183 days shall be levied
same progressive tax rates as
residents;
N/A

3.2.4 (g) The Two Revisions in 1979-Second Stage SEI
In 1979, Taiwan's diplomatic relationships with the world seriously shrank in the wake of

the U.S. 's breaking ties with Taiwan. Two more revisions of the tax incentive scheme were
under way to reflect a new policy emphasis of developing national defense industries and a
continuing effort to redress oil price crises.

The scope of productive industries was expanded to include the technical service industry
and national defense industry. Tax exemption was accorded to enterprises in the national defense
industry as well as importers of natural resources.

These revisions included an expansion of scope of productive industries to include the
technical service industry as an encouraged industry (Article 3), in order to develop a precision
technology industry. The changes also added capital- or technology-intensive productive
enterprises engaging in the national defense industry as an encouraged industry (Article 10). Tax
exemption from the income tax and stamp tax was extended to enterprises engaging in the
national defense industry (Article 22). The changes extended tax exemption to enterprises that
imported foreign natural resources into Taiwan (Article 5).

Other developments included changes of tax base, increasing tax exempt dividend and
regulations on M&A. The tax base was revised to "annual taxable income," instead of the
previous "annual income" to rectify the anomaly that some enterprises were prevented from
enjoying tax exemption accorded them (Article 10). The changes increased the tax-exempt
dividends from NT $8,000 to NT $12,000 (Article 16). Article 34 repealed the requirement of
minimum export amount for enterprises to enjoy tax preferences accorded to merger and
acquisition.
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Table 11 Changes Made by the Two Revisions ofthe Second Stage SEI in 1979

Scheme
Expanded Productive Industry

Extended Tax Exemption to
Importation of Foreign Natural
Resources
Changed Tax Base
Tax Exemption of Income Tax and
Stamp Tax
Increased Tax Exempt Dividends
Repealed Minimum Export Amount
for Qualifying for Tax Preferences in
Merger and Acquisition

Scope
1. Added technical service
industry;
2. Added national defense industry
as encouraged industry

Comparison with prior law
1. N/A
2. N/A

N/A

1. "annual taxable income"
1. Applicable to national defense
industry enterprises;
1. Increased to NT$12,OOO

1. Previously, "annual income"

1. Previous lv, NT$8,OOO

3.2.5 Transformation-The Third Stage of the SEI (1980-1990)
Going into the 1980s, Taiwan's economic growth slowed down because other developing
countries replaced Taiwan in the traditional labor-intensive industries as Taiwan's competitive
advantage of low-cost labor gradually disappeared. Out of prudence, Taiwan chose to continue
using tax incentive schemes in shaping its industrial direction when the Second Stage SEI
expired in the end of 1980. The Third Stage of the SEI (the "Third Stage SEI") aimed to attract
high-tech, high-value added product industries. Environmental concerns were part ofthe picture
as Taiwan suffered from serious pollution due to previous industrial development.

3.2.5 (a) The Creation of the Third Stage of the SEI-1980
The Third Stage SEI expanded the Second Stage SEI's 82 provisions into 89 provisions.
The basic scheme was retained, but the direction was sharply different. The expanded tax
incentive scheme of the Third Stage SEI was mainly in encouragement of R&D, upgrading of
industries, and anti-pollution purchases, whereas the basic scheme of the Second Stage SEI
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reflected the formation of a tax incentive system with an emphasis on manufacturing.

The Third Stage SEI included a tax deduction and tax deferral for equipment investment
and profits reinvestment on equipment, a tax deferral for importation of foreign natural resources,
and extending tax holiday or accelerated depreciation for R&D investment. Installment payments
of tax and import duty exemption were extended to importation of parts and materials, and tax
exemptions were conferred for anti-pollution purposes.

Article 10 provided that productive enterprises could deduct 10 to 15 percent of
equipment investment and the deduction could be carried over for the next four years when the
deduction exceeded the taxable income. Article 8 provided a tax deferral of up to four years on
enterprises importing foreign natural resources. Previous law conferred tax exemption to such
enterprises without prescribing the applicable duration. Article 35 extended a tax holiday or
accelerated depreciation to qualified enterprises spending a certain percentage of investment on
research and development. Articles 23 to 38 provided further tax incentive measures to
encourage the continued development of capital markets. Article 12 provided accelerated
depreciation of 50% reduction of useful life on enterprises upgrading production equipment. A
tax deferral on shareholder's newly issued registered stocks was conferred when enterprises
reinvested the undistributed profits in equipment or machinery upgrading (Article 13).

Article 46 added a 2-year accelerated depreciation for for-profit enterprises' purchases of
energy-saving equipment and machinery. This article also conferred the same treatment on forprofit enterprises purchasing anti-pollution equipment and machinery. Installment payments of
tax and exemptions of import duty were granted on the importation of parts and materials for
manufacturing machines and equipment (Article 21). Such incentives were also applicable to
importation of apparatuses and equipment for quality testing purposes. The same incentives
were accorded to merger and acquisition (Article 38) of productive enterprises forced to relocate

by reason of affecting public interests such as pollution (Article 39). Besides installment tax
payment and import duty exemption, productive enterprises received exemptions from income
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tax, stamp tax, and deed tax resulting from relocation.

Other amendments involved a streamlining and consolidation effort, such as repealing
provisions redundant to other laws. For example, article 13 of the Second Stage SEI regarding
tax exemptions for reinvested profits for non-qualified limited corporations was eliminated
because of a repetition with article 42 ofthe Income Tax Law.
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Table 12 Comparison of the Basic Scheme between the Second Stage SEI and
the Third Stage SEI
Scheme
Tax Deduction for Equipment
Investment

Tax Deferral of Importation of
Natural Ftesources
Tax Holiday or Accelerated
Depreciation for Ft & D Investment
Measures Encouraged Capital
Markets

Accelerated Depreciation

Tax Deferral on Fteinvested Profits
for Upgrading Equipment and
Facilities
2-Year Accelerated Depreciation

Installment Payments of Tax and
Import Duty Exemption

Exemptions of Income Tax, Stamp
Tax and Deed Tax

Third Stage SEI-1980
1. deduct 10-15% of equipment
investment; carried over for next 4
years if deduction exceeded taxable
income;
1. up to 4 years;

Second Stage SEI-1970
N/A

N/A
N/A

1. Tax Exemption of Long Term
Capital Gains by Purchases of
Stocks or Bonds
1. for Upgrading Equipment and
Facilities Fteduction of up to 50% of
useful life;

1. Yes

for purchases of energy-saving
equipment and machinery;
2 for purchases of anti-pollution
equipment and machinery
1. for importation of parts and
materials
2 for importation of apparatuses
and equipment for quality
testing purposes;
1 for M & A purposes;
2. for forced relocation of plant
due to pollution;

1.

1.

N/A
Productive enterprises choose
either tax holiday or accelerated
depreciation
3. Shortened useful life of fixed
assets: i) machinery/equipment:
10 years to become 5 years;
lesser than 10 years to become
half of that useful life; ii)
buildings/ facilities/
transportation and
communication facilities:
accelerated by one third of
useful life.
3. Applicable: i) new investors; ii)
exparision and renovation of
existing productive enterprises
1. N/A
2. For profits reinvestment in
manufacturing;
1. N/A
2. N/A

2.

1.

2.
3.

N/A
N/A
For Establishment of Productive
Enterprises;

1.

N/A

2. N/A
3. F or purchasing or leasing
industrial use land;
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3.2.5 (b)

The 1982 Revision of the Third Stage SEI

In 1982, in view of Taiwan's economic slowdown, Taiwan revised the Third Stage SEI,

in concert with other financial and administrative improvements. Provisions also included tax
incentive schemes to facilitate the construction of the Taipei World Trade Center and favorable
tax treatment for trading conglomerates as Taiwan aimed to keep up with the standards of world
financial centers.

The revision included further defining the duration of tax holiday for capital- or techintensive industries and extending beneficial tax treatment to skyscraper construction investors.
This revision also extended tax incentive schemes to trading conglomerates.

For capital- or technological-intensive industries, Article 7 extended the starting date of
tax exemption from one year after starting sale of goods or employment to two years after such
date. Tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation were extended to investors for construction of
skyscrapers pursuant to the World Trade Center plan, which was a new infrastructure investment
plan to enhance Taiwan's status as regional financial center (Article 8, Section 1). A reduced
25% income rate was to apply to trading conglomerates, whose qualifying criteria were
promulgated by the Executive Yuan (Article 15). Article 41 raised the permissible undistributed
profits to two times of the paid-in capital for publicly traded companies and encouraged
industries.
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Table 13 Changes Made at the 1982 Revision of the Third Stage SEI

Scheme
Extended Starting Date of Tax
Holiday

Scope
1. extended from 1 to 2 years after
date of starting sales of goods or
employment for capital- or
technological-intensive industries;

Expanded Tax Exemption or
Accelerated Depreciation
Reduced Maximum Income Tax
Rate to Trading Conglomerates
Raised the Upper Limit of
Undistributed Profits

1. Extended to investors in
construction of skyscraper industry
1. extended the 25% beneficial tax
rate to trading conglomerates;
1. to two times of the paid-in capital
for publicly traded companies and
productive industries;

Comparison with prior law
Previously, tax holiday started from
date of starting sales of goods or
employment; some capital- or techintensive industries started tax
holiday from one to four years after
date of sales of goods or
employment

1. Previously 100% of the paid-in
capital;

3.2.5 (c) The 1984 Revision of the Third Stage SEI

In 1984, in light of growing trade protectionism from the formation of more trading blocs,

amendments were under way. Revisions included further expansion of encouraged productive
industries; extending tax preferences to importation of finished products and technology transfer;
changes of tax deduction rate and carried-over years for equipment investment; beneficial tax
rate conferred on venture capital industry; and tax deduction for R&D expenditures.

These amendments added the public facility construction industry to the encouraged
industries (Article 3). Tax preferences were conferred on importation of finished products from
overseas investment, as well as on technology transfers (Article 8). The tax deduction rate for
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equipment investment was changed to range between 5% and 20%, as opposed to the previous
10% to 15% (Article 10). Such tax deductions could not exceed 50% of taxable income. Article
10 also extended the applicable deduction carried-over years to five years from the previous four
years. Article 34 provided a tax deduction of up to 20 percent of the research and development
expenses exceeding highest levels of past five years, but the amount deductible could not exceed
50% of taxable income and the amount exceeding would be carried over for the following five
years. Article 15 conferred the reduced 25% income tax rate on the venture capital industry; and
tax exemptions for dividends from that industry were provided in Article 16.

Article 39 expanded the scope of encouraged treatment for plant relocation by reason of
pubic interests such as pollution and zoning. Article 41 expanded the permissible amount of
reserved profits--this move was to encourage capital reinvestment of high-tech industries.
Articles 54, 71, 72 and 80 provided incentives to facilitate deregulating industrial use land.
Another addition included a proviso in Article 29 providing mutuality for tax-exemption on
airlines to protest countries such as Thailand and the Philippines that levied a business tax on
Taiwan's airlines.
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Table 14 Changes Made at the 1984 Revision of the Third Stage SEI
Scheme
Expanded Productive Industries

Scope
1. added the public facility
construction industry to productive
industries

Extended Tax Incentives as
Accorded to Productive Industries to
Importation of Finished Products
and Technology Transfers;
Tax Deduction Rate and CarriedOver Duration for Equipment
Investment and R&D Expenses

1.

2.
1.
2.

3.

Extended BenefIcial Income Tax
Rate and Tax Exemptions for
Dividends

3.2.5 (d)

1.

to importation of fInished
products from overseas
investment;
technology transfers;
deduct 5% -20% of equipment
investment;
carried over for next 5 years if
deduction exceeded taxable
income;
R&D Expenses are deductible
up to 20% of highest amount in
the past fIve years; with the
deductible amount not
exceeding 50% of taxable
income; the amount exceeding
50% of taxable income would
be carried over for the next 5
years;
to venture capital industry;

Comparison with prior law
1. Previously, investors in
constructing skyscrapers were
accorded tax incentives as
productive industries
NIA

1.
2.

3.

Previously, 10% to 15%
Carried over for next 4 years;
NIA previously.

NIA

The 1987 Revision of the Third Stage SEI

In 1987, the Third Stage SEI was revised again to facilitate Taiwan's further industrial
transformation from labor intensive industries to capital-intensive or high value added industries.
The revision was to encourage formation and reorganization of foreign branches. The
strategically encouraged industry expanded to Super ICIDRAM industry. Venture capital
industry was further accorded beneficial tax treatment.

Changes at this revision included extending encouraged treatment to foreign branches
other than subsidiaries (Article 3). But Article 13 provided that foreign branches' undistributed
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profits was treated the same as those of foreign subsidiaries. That is to say, no preferential tax
treatment was conferred. The same tax exemption accorded to M & A under Article 38 was
applicable to the reorganization of subsidiaries into branches. That is to say, tax exemption was
conferred on income tax, stamp tax, and deed tax when purchasing or leasing land. But an
additional 20% tax was levied on foreign branches for their profits repatriating to foreign parent
in order to equalize the tax burden of branches and subsidiaries (Article 15).

Article 15 reduced maximum income tax rate for trading conglomerates to 22%, as
opposed to the previous 25%. A tax deduction of up to 30% was accorded to specificallyencouraged high-tech industries such as Super ICIDRAM industry (Article 20).

The venture capital industry was accorded a 20% tax deduction of the investment amount;
a reduced tax rate of20% was levied on the venture capital industry (Article 15); this was a
further reduction from the previous 25%. Article 16 provided a tax exemption of up to 80% of
income for the venture capital industry.

Other revisions involved consolidation with other tax laws, for example, Articles 11,29,
30, 33 and 45 were repealed because they were redundant with the new Business Income Tax
Law. These provisions were about export income, national defense armament sales, and
industrial use land regulation.
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Table 15 Changes Made at the 1987 Revision of the Third Stage SEI

Scheme
Tax Incentives Extended to Foreign
Branch

Exemptions ofIncome Tax, Stamp
Tax and Deed Tax

Reduced Maximum Income Tax
Rate
Tax Deduction to Specifically
Encouraged Industries-Super
ICIDRAM Industry and Venture
Capital Industry
Tax Exemption on Income

Scope
1. applicable to productive
industries' foreign branches, not
including subsidiaries
2. but foreign branches'
undistributed profits accorded
the same treatment as foreign
subsidiaries' undistributed
profits;
3. but 20% tax rate was applicable
to foreign branches' repatriating
profits to their foreign parents;
1. the same tax benefits accorded to
M&A were applicable to
reorganization of subsidiaries into
branches;
1. up to 22% on trading
conglomerates;
1. up to 30% of investment for
Super IC industry;
2. up to 20% of investment for
venture capital industry
1. Up to 80% of income
2. Applicable: venture capital
industry;

COInparison with prior law
N/A

1. previously, 25%

1.
2.

NIA, previously
Previously, 25%

Previously, venture capital industry
enjoyed beneficial income tax rate
and tax exemptions for dividends

3.2.6 Consolidation--The Statute for Upgrading Industries (the "SUI")

After thirty years of a patchwork of continuous revisions, the SEI law created a tax
regime too piecemeal and complex for tax administration. Redundancy or even language
problems either canceled the intended effects or created unintended results. For example, one of
the revisions in 1979 changed the language of Article 10, from "annual income" to "annual
taxable income." Also Taiwan's basic tax incentive schemes were to grant tax exemption
starting from the first year of starting sale of goods or employment. This created an inherent
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fallacy that some enterprises would never enjoy the entitled tax holiday since by nature the
benefit was applicable only to those enterprises that enjoyed profits for taxable years. This
problem triggered one of the major revisions in the Second Stage SEI: productive enterprises
were to choose between either enjoying an income tax holiday or accelerated depreciation. Later,
in the 1977 revision, Taiwan allowed capital-or technology-intensive industries to postpone the
inception of the tax holiday.

Also, through a trial and error process, Taiwan's industrial policy changed from exportoriented labor-intensive industries, to capital- or technological intensive industries (i.e., heavymachinery, basic metal, petro-chemical and vessel construction industries), to super les
industries to high-tech OEM and computer chip foundries. This series of policy changes and
industrial transformations made the SEls obsolete. Taiwan thus decided to let the Third Stage
SEI expire and replaced it with the Statute for Upgrading Industries (the "SUI") in 1990.

3.2.6 (a)

The Creation of the Statute for Upgrading Industries (the "SUI"k=1990

The SUI consolidated and streamlined the SEls' tax incentive schemes, with a main
directional change toward facilitating the establishment of high-tech based industries and
upgrading all industries in Taiwan. To begin with, 44 provisions replaced the Third Stage SEI's
89 provisions. Productive industries were the applicable industries for the tax incentive system.
The law had all the main features of the prior laws; that is, tax holidays, tax exemption, tax rate
reduction, tax reduction, deduction carryover, and accelerated appreciation. But instead of prior
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laws' choice between tax holidays and accelerated depreciation, this law allowed the strategically
important industries the choice between tax holidays and tax deductions and carryover for stocks
as the basic structure. The encouraged industries included technological-, capital-intensive and
venture capital industries. The tax incentive scheme was also extended to tech-based equipment
and machinery and anti-pollution facilities purchases.

As its name suggests, this law aimed to provide incentives to upgrade all industries,
including agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors to make their transformation into
technological-based industries possible (Article 1). Accelerated depreciation was accorded to
companies' fixed assets (Article 2). Prior laws offered extensive accelerated deprecation
incentives as manufacturing industries were the mainstay.

Tax deductions of up to 50% of income were conferred' on investment in automated
equipment and technology, waste management, resource recycling, R& D, and energy-saving
equipment (Article 3). The deductible amount ranged from 5 % to 20 % of the investment. A
four-year carryover was allowed when the deduction exceeded taxable income. The 50% income
deduction was not applicable in the last year of the carryover. Prior laws had allowed the
deductible amount to range between 10% to 15%, and four-year carryover (and once changed to
five year carryover). Article 7 provided tax deductions of up to 20% of investment for investment
in lagging areas. The deduction was to be carried over for four years. Similar tax deductions
were accorded to stocks held for two and more years by investors of important technological-,
capital-intensive and the venture capital industries (Article 8). These encouraged industries
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would choose between tax exemption of income tax or tax deductions of stocks (Article 8).

In the case of tax holidays, the measure was the same as in the SEIs; that is, a five year
tax holiday starting from date of starting sale of goods/ providing services or employment.
Enterprises were to choose postponement of starting date of tax holiday within two years of date
of starting sale of goods/providing services or employment.

A 20% withholding tax was levied for nonresidents (Article 11). Prior laws had a 35%
withholding tax rate. Income of foreign employees of an encouraged enterprise who stayed less
than 183 days in Taiwan was deemed not derived from Taiwan (Article 12). This was the same as
prior laws.

Article 13 continued the SEIs' incentive schemes for merger and acquisition, such as
stamp tax and deed tax exemptions. Other measures such as forced plant relocation by reason of
pollution (Article 14), increased amount of undistributed profits (Article 15), tax exemption of
newly issued stocks by virtue of reinvestment and estate and gift tax consequences of such stocks
(Article 16) were similar to the SEIs. The SUI also continued the SEIs' regulation of the
development fund. The SEIs' extensive regulation of industrial use land was consolidated into a
section devoted to regulating industrial complexes (Articles 23 to 42).
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Table 16 Comparisons between the Basic Schemes ofthe SUI and the Third Stage SEI
Scheme
Accelerated Depreciation

The SUI-1990
1. Fixed assets

Tax Deduction

1.

Tax Holiday or Tax Deduction of
Stocks

Withholding Tax for Nonresidents
Taiwan-source income

Exemption from Stamp Tax, Deed
Tax

for investment up to 50% of
taxable income;
2. deduction ranged 5-20% of
investment;
3. 4 year carryover for deduction
exceeding taxable income;
4. applicable to: automatic
equipment and technology,
waste management, resource
recycling, R&D, energy-saving
equipment;
5. deduction of 20% of investment
for investment in lagging areas;
carryover for 4 years;
1. Deduction of 20% of value of
stocks held two years or longer
by investors of important tech-,
capital-intensive industries and
venture capital industry; 4 year
carryover period; can choose
between tax deduction and
income tax exemption;
2. Starting date: a five year tax
holiday started from date of
starting sales of goods or
employment;
3. Enterprises were to choose
postponement of stating date
within two years of date of
starting sales of goods or
employment;
1.20%
1. Income of Foreign Employees of
an Encouraged Enterprise who
stayed less than 183 days was
deemed not Taiwan-source income
1. for M&A purposes;
2 .. applicable to forced relocation
because of'pollution;
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The Third Stage SEI-1980
1. Same
2. 2-year accelerated depreciation
for energy-saving and antipollution equipment and
machinery;
3. for upgrading equipment and
facilities; reduction of up to
50% of useful life;
1. Same;
2. Deduct 10-15% of equipment
investment;
3. Carried over for next 4 years if
deduction exceeded taxable
income (later 5 years);
4. NIA to automatic equipment and
technology, waste management,
resource recycling; but
applicable to R&D, energysaving equipment;
5. N/A

1.

2.
3.

NIA; Choice between tax
holiday or accelerated
depreciation;
Same;
N/A

1. 35%
1. Same

1.
2.

Same
Same

Up to Two Times Paid-in Capital for
Allowed Undistributed Profits
Tax Exemption of Reinvested
Profits; But Estate and Gift Tax
Consequences
Regulation of Development Fund
Regulation of Land Use

1. same

1. same

1. Yes

1. same

1. Yes

1. Yes

1. consolidated into sections
regulating industrial complexes for
high-tech industries;

1. regulated industrial use land;
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Chapter 4 Conclusion
As with other East Asian NICs, Taiwan's tax incentive systems acted as a fiscal policy
tool to facilitate Taiwan's leap into the success of sustained economic progress. Taiwan's system
was created, revised and recreated again as the society changed over time. The system helped
Taiwan grow from the 1950s-1960s' import substitution policy, 1970s' export oriented industries
policy, 1980s' capital or technology intensive industries to 1990s' high-tech semiconductor chip
manufacturing industries. Each period had its unique problems with which the Taiwan economic
planning team responded. The responses to the challenges of the time thus reshaped the system
time and again.

The system also benefited from learning from other NICs or advanced countries as long
as the learning would benefit Taiwan. Such learning included the recent learning from Singapore,
Japan, South Korea and UK. Broadly speaking, the financial aid from the U.S. acted as a catalyst
for the creation of Taiwan's economic planning bureau and left an indelible mark in Taiwan's
economic success story. Historically, the Japanese colonial legacy, including the physical and
system infrastructures such as modem economic and financial systems, paved the road for
Taiwan's later development.

The open and willing emulation of other societies' better systems played an important
role in Taiwan's excellence in the economic competition. As a tiny island state where trading
naturally prevailed, Taiwan had been accustomed to interaction with outsiders. Taiwan's trading
and learning from more advanced countries at that time was historically inevitable-in Qing
(Ch'ing) dynasty, trading and learning from mainland China, in Japanese era, trading and
learning from Japan, during the Korean War and later, trading and learning from the U.S., and
later, Taiwan's trading foothold set in every continent.

Taiwan's openness and learning contrasted with China's closed-door policy historically
and before the 1978 opening. China has been plagued with ambivalence toward western systems
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ever since Britain treacherously forced China to open its port cities by the Opium War. Later in
the Mao's Communist reign, self dependence (autarchy) and xenophobia, along with its
communist ideology, prevented China from catching up with the times.

As a fiscal policy tool, tax incentive systems were not without criticism. Contrarians
focused on the efficacy of the system from the angles of alternatives (Surrey) and context
(Yelpaala). Others argued the system may be efficient from the points of cost (Zelinsky) and
readiness to use (Okimoto). Country studies have shown that tax incentive systems may be
secondary in investment considerations, but they may be important for certain types of industries
such as export-oriented industries and large scale industries, not to mention that the lack of these
systems may be perceived adversely by others as to the developing country's amenability to
international standards and its willingness to improve the investment environment for foreigners.

Common bonds such as dense popUlation, deficient natural resources, cultural common
lineage, interlinked economic and trading activities were cited as motives and sources for the
economic success of these East Asian NICs. Also, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other
East Asian NICs all underwent administrative reforms, adopted export-oriented industrial policy
at the outset, and liberalized fiscal and financial measures gradually. Each society at the same
time faced its unique problems and circumstances and their solutions over the challenges must
naturally be unique.

Using the evolution of Taiwan's tax incentive systems as an illustration, this thesis aimed
to show how an East Asian NIC became what it has become today. Taiwan's unique solutions to
the challenges of the time in the context of tax incentive systems showed responsiveness and
flexibility in its economic planning. Note that the economic planning mechanism itself was not
without criticism-scholars criticized this system as "ill-coordinated and fragmented." The team
evolved from an agency handling the U.S. financial aid and was formalized when the U.S. aid
left. The economic planning system consisted of technocrats who worked in multitudes of
cabinet level decisionmaking environments-"a profusion of independent cabinet-level
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agencies." This system was criticized as lacking party and legislative supervision. Thus, the
freedom of technocrats' decision making power in Taiwan was actually large, although
somewhat counterbalanced by the complexity and fluidity of the administrative structure.

By analyzing the evolution of Taiwan's tax incentive system as part of Taiwan's
economic planning measures, this thesis concludes that the freedom to respond and flexibility in
the face of challenges may have been one of the crucial elements for the success of Taiwan's
economic planning. This conclusion also coincides with one of the basic principles of tax policy
in developing countries; that is, developing countries' tax policies should be practical and should
accommodate the particular circumstances of the country in question.

In essence, Taiwan's system was more of a product of a trial and error process--dealing

with the impacts more on an ad hoc case by case basis than through a forward-looking thoughtout planning. As aforementioned, this character corresponded with that of Taiwan's economic
planning machines-the policy-making process has been piecemeal and full of improvisation due
to the ever shifting power center without party supervision. This character, however, created a
freedom for the policy-making machines to react much unlike the comparable policy-making
structures of a check-and-balance system such as those of the U.S. system. Paradoxically, this
unintended freedom increased the policy-making machines' flexibility and capability, in conttast
to Taiwan's relatively inflexible political machines and the policies. This freedom helped Taiwan
rise to the occasion in the face of the ever-changing internal and international needs, impacts and
the diplomatic impasse.

At this post -1997 Asian financial crisis era, the East Asian NICs' economic progress has
slowed down and their economic decisionmaking has been in doubt. Numerous arguments have
been advanced for the reasons ofthis "Great Asian Slump." Taiwan has actually fared relatively
well. According to Wade, this is because Taiwan came out of similar crisis in early 1990s, thus
survived relatively unscathed. (Wade, 1998: 698) Wang pointed out that the Taiwan
government's lesser interventionist approach was behind the smoother path. (Wang, 2001: 2-3)
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By examining the evolution of Taiwan's tax incentive system, this thesis concludes that
Taiwan's flexible economic planning helped the shaping of Taiwan's economy today. An
implication from this study is that this system may stand further testing ifthe pinpointed freedom
of making decision and flexibility remain intact. At this juncture, reexamining the process
Taiwan has gone through and remembering its lessons may be crucial for Taiwan's survival and
prosperity in the new century. This study may also provide China, or other developing countries
precious lessons in their common drive to reach prosperity facing the dilemma of danger and
opportunity along the way.
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Statute for Encouragement of Investment (the "SEr'), Taxation Collections of the Republic of
China, Ministry of Finance, R.O.C.
---------------------First Stage SEI, 1960.
---------------------Second Stage SEI: As amended on December 30, 1970. Amendment was
effective as of January 1, 1971.
---------------------Third Stage SEI: As amended on December 30, 1980.Amendedment was
effective as of January 1, 1981.
Statute for Upgrading Industries (the "sur')---enacted on December 29, 1990.

68

